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EXEMPLA DOCENT.  HOW TO MAK E SENSE 
OF ARISTOTLE’S EX AMPLES OF THE FALLACY 
OF ACCIDENT (DOXOGR APHY MATTERS)
Leone Gazziero*
Summary : 1. Prolegomena : the consensus of  the perplexed. 2. Aristotle’s definition of  the fal-
lacy of  accident. 3. Aristotle’s standard examples of  the fallacy of  accident. 4. Aristotle’s star 
examples of  the fallacy of  accident. 5. Epilegomena : beware of  those who mock the overculti-
vated straw in the eye of  their neighbour and are content with the illiterate beam in their own.
Терез : « Мамо, я не дівчинка » (Terez : « Mom, I’m not a child »)
Мама : « А хто ти ? » (Mom : « What are you then ? »)
Терез : « Папа сказав, що я сердита дівчинка » (Terez : « Dad told me I’m a hot-
tempered child »).
1. Prolegomena: the consensus of the perplexed
The fallacy of  accident has a long established reputation of  not being a masterpiece of  clarity. Already in the 1860s, Edward Poste berated it as 
« ill-defined », labelled some of  his examples as « eccentric » and suggested we 
drop it altogether from Aristotle’s list of  fallacies and apportion its content 
among the other classes of  sophisms. 1 About a century afterwards, Charles 
Leonard Hamblin still lamented the fact that the fallacy is « seldom under-
stood » and gave Aristotle the blame, since – for one thing – it is unclear what 
« accident » means here and – for another – it is nowhere precisely stated how 
* leone.gazziero@univ-lille3.fr. Unité Mixte de Recherche 8163 « Savoirs, textes, langa-
ge », CNRS - Université de Lille iii, 59653 Villeneuve d’Ascq Cedex, France.
1 E. Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies or The Sophistici Elenchi, Macmillan, London 1866, p. 158. 
Among those who have followed Poste’s advice, the secundum quid fallacy has received the 
lion’s share : cf. for emphasis D.N. Walton, Ignoring Qualifications (Secundum Quid) as a Sub-
fallacy of  Hasty Generalization, « Logique & Analyse », 129-130 (1990), pp. 113-114 and The Place 
of  Emotion in Argument, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park 1992, p. 37. 
More in general, this solution has found favour with English-speaking authors of  logical 
textbooks, who usually treat them as a converse pair : cf. e.g. W.S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons 
in Logic : Deductive and Inductive, Macmillan, London 1870, p. 176, J.G. Hibben, Logic Deductive 
and Inductive, C. Schribner’s Sons, New York 1905, pp. 161-162 and H.W.B. Joseph, Introduc-
tion to Logic, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1916, p. 574, note 1 and pp. 588-589 down to W.T. Parry 
and E.A. Hacker, Aristotelian Logic, SUNY, Albany 1991, p. 438. 
334 leone gazziero
we are to interpret it. 2 A few years later, Sten Ebbesen’s claim that the fallacy’s 
major flaw is that its definition does not match its own examples will meet 
with everybody’s approval. 3
Since of  late the compatibility issue appears to have drawn most of  the 
scholarly dissatisfaction and it is, by its own right, as good a point as any (and 
better than most 4) to start looking into the matter, I shall deal with it in some 
detail hereafter. In order to do so, I will provide, first, a general account of  
the fallacy of  accident ; then, I will show accordingly that Aristotle’s examples 
are consistent with it. For convenience and for reasons that will become clear, 
these will be split into two families, the « standard » and the « star » ones.
2. Aristotle’s definition of the fallacy of accident
2. 1. What does para; to; sumbebhkov~ means ?
As far as its name is concerned, Byzantine and Latin commentators were ordi-
narily right. Even if  this is not its most distinctive sense nor the very first that 
springs to mind, 5 sumbebhkov~ means here whatever predicate is said of  a sub-
ject, irrespective of  its being an essential or an accidental property :
Anonymi Commentarium ii, S. Ebbesen (ed.), Commentators and Commentaries on 
Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi, Brill, Leiden 1981, ii, 42.1-2 : « “pra`gma” levgei to; suvnqeton, 
2 C.L. Hamblin, Fallacies, Methuen, London 1970, p. 84. 
3 S. Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi, Brill, Lei-
den 1981, i, p. 224. H. Goodenough Gelber, The Fallacy of  Accident and the dictum de omni. 
Late Medieval Controversy over a Reciprocal Pair, « Vivarium », 25 (1987), p. 110 ; A. Bueno, Ar-
istotle, the Fallacy of  Accident and the Nature of  Predication. A Historical Inquiry, « Journal of  
the History of  Philosophy », 26 (1988), p. 9 ; J.M. Gambra, Medieval Solutions to the Sophism 
of  Accident, in K. Jacobi (ed.), Argumentationstheorie, Brill, Leiden 1993, p. 431 ; L.-A. Dori-
on, Aristote. Les réfutations sophistiques, Presses de l’Université Laval, Montréal - Vrin, Paris 
1995, p. 233, note 58 ; C. Shields, Order in Multiplicity. Homonymy in the Philosophy of  Aristotle, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1999, p. 166 ; P. Fait, Aristotele e i paralogismi dell’identità, « Rivista 
di storia della filosofia », 2 (2008), p. 206 ; D. Botting, Fallacies of  Accident, « Argumentation », 
26 (2012), p. 270 all agree with Sten Ebbesen’s assessment. Aristotle’s examples had already 
been criticised, and viciously at that, by F.C.S. Schiller, Aristotle’s Refutation of  « Aristotelian » 
Logic, « Mind », 23 (1914), pp. 4-5. 
4 If  anything, because Aristotle’s solution consists precisely in prompting the respondent 
to offer counterexamples whenever he suspects the argument he is dealing with to be a fal-
lacy of  accident (cf. section 2.2 below). 
5 For a preliminary survey of  Aristotle’s notion of  « accident » in dialectical contexts, cf. 
M. van Aubel, Accident, catégories et prédicables dans l’œuvre d’Aristote, « Revue Philosophique 
de Louvain », 61 (1963), pp. 361-401 and J. Brunschwig, Note sur la conception aristotélicienne 
de l’accident, in Aa.Vv., Methexis. Etudes néoplatoniciennes présentées au professeur Evanghelos 
A. Moutsopoulos, ciepa, Athens 1992, pp. 67-80. More in general, cf. A. Urbanas, La notion 
d’accident chez Aristote, Les Belles Lettres, Paris - Bellarmin, Montréal 1988, and T. Ebert, 
Aristotelian Accidents, « Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy », 16 (1998), pp. 133-159. 
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“sumbebhko;~” de; pa`n kathgorouvmenon, ei[te tw`n oujsiwdw`~ uJparcovntwn, ei[te kai; mhv 
[we call “pragma” the composite and “sumbebêkos” any predicate, whether it is an 
essential attribute or not] ». 6
Ps.-Alexandri I (Michaeli Ephesii) in Aristotelis sophisticos elenchos commentarium, M. 
Wallies (ed.), Reimer, Berlin 1898, 37.23-26 : « pra`gma me;n levgwn to; suvnqeton kai; 
uJpokeivmenon, sumbebhko;~ de; aJplw`~ pa`n kathgorouvmenon, ka[n te tw`n oujsiwdw`~ kai; 
kaq∆ auJto; uJparcovntwn tw/ `kaq∆ ou| kathgorei`taiv ejsti ka[n te kai; mhv [Aristotle calls 
“pragma” the composite, that is to say the subject, and “sumbebêkos” any predicate in 
general, whether or not it belongs essentially and by itself  to what it is predicated of] ».
Anonymi glosae in Aristotelis Sophisticos elenchos, L.M. de Rijk (ed.), Logica Modernorum, 
Van Gorcum, Assen 1962, 214.20-22 : « notandum quod “accidens” dicitur hic 
predicatum, sive de se tantum sive de alio predicetur, sive sit substantiale sive 
accidentale [it should be noted that “accidens” means here predicate, whether it is 
predicated of  itself  or of  something else, whether it is essential or accidental] » ; cf. 
214.10 : « secundum accidens, idest secundum praedicatum [“secundum accidens”, 
that is ‘predicate related’] ».
Anonymi summa sophisticorum elenchorum, L.M. de Rijk (ed.), Logica Modernorum, Van 
Gorcum, Assen 1962, 356.7-10 : « “accidens” enim ibi largo modo accipitur, scilicet pro 
quolibet predicato, sive accidentale sit sive substantiale [“accident” is taken here in a 
broad sense and means any predicate, whether accidental or essential] ».
Anonymi parisiensis compendium sophisticorum elenchorum, S. Ebbesen and Y. Iwakuma 
(ed.), « Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin », 60 (1990), 88.19-22 : « Accidens 
autem hic appellat Aristoteles praedicatum : cum enim subiectum et accidens relativa 
sunt, et quod in propositione subicitur subiectum dicatur, non debet mirum videri 
si eius praedicatum accidens appelletur [Aristotle calls here “accidens” the predicate. 
Since the subject and the accident are relative and the subject is said to be underlying, 
it does not come as a surprise that its predicate is called “accidens”] ».
Anonymi cantabrigiensis commentarium in Aristotelis sophisticos elenchos, Cambridge St 
John’s College D.12, 89vb 17-18 : « accidens in hac iunctura locutionis “fallacia secundum 
accidens” dicitur praedicatum sive ipsum sit accidentale praedicabile sive substantiale 
[“accidens” within the expression “fallacia secundum accidens” means predicate, 
whether it is something predicated accidentally or essentially] » ; cf. 89vb 4-5 : « dicitur 
accidens omne praedicabile sive accidentale sive quod non <est> accidentale sive 
substantiale [we call “accidens” everything that may be predicated, either accidental 
or non-accidental, that is to say essential] ».
Anonymi fallacie londinenses, L.M. de Rijk (ed.), Logica modernorum. A Contribution to 
the History of  Early Terminist Logic, Van Gorcum, Assen 1967, 669.4-5 : « accidens prout 
hic accipitur idem est quod praedicatum [the way “accidens” is understood here, it 
means the same as predicate] ».
6 Definition echoed by Ps.-Alexandri II (Michaeli Ephesii) in Aristotelis sophisticos elenchos 
commentarium, S. Ebbesen (ed.), Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici 
Elenchi, Brill, Leiden 1981, ii, 166.7-9. 
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Guillelmi de Montibus ( ?) fallaciae, Y. Iwakuma (ed.), The Fallaciae and Loci of  William 
de Montibus. An Edition, « Journal of  Fukui Prefectural University », 2 (1993), 15.17-18 : 
« secundum accidens dicitur quasi secundum praedicatum [“secundum accidens” 
means pretty much the same as “predicate related”] ».
Anonymi fallaciae lemovicenses, S. Ebbesen and Y. Iwakuma (ed.), « Cahiers de l’Institut 
du Moyen Age Grec et Latin », 63 (1993), 30.29 : « prout hic dicitur accidens idem est 
quod praedicatus [what is called here “accidens” is the same as “predicate”] ».
Some present-day scholars have espoused the view as well, 7 notably Denis 
Zaslawsky, 8 Louis-André Dorion 9 and Mario Mignucci. The latter pointed out 
a few years ago that the « accident » involved in the fallacy of  the same name 
refers to essential and accidental properties alike :
M. Mignucci, Puzzles about Identity. Aristotle and His Greek Commentators, in J. Wiesner 
(ed.), Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung, W. de Gruyter, Berlin 1985, i, p. 75 : « I propose that 
sumbebhkov~ in the formula kata; sumbebhko;~ paralogismoiv does not refer to acci-
dent in its technical opposition to essence or substance, but simply means “attribute” 
or “property” without any explicit hint at the distinction between essential and non-
essential properties of  a substance ».
Mario Mignucci also suggested that Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 7, 169b 4-6 
confirms this view. In fact, the way Aristotle states the difficulty of  ascertain-
ing which attributes are both attributes of  the thing and of  what is predicated 
of  the thing makes it clear that the verbs sumbaivnw and kathgorevw are syn-
onyms :
Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, W.D. Ross (ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford 1958, 7, 169b 4-6 : 
« <hJ ajpavth givnetai dia; to; mh; duvnasqai diakrivnein> toi`~ poivoi~ tw`n kathgorhmav- 
twn pavnta taujta; kai; tw/ `pravgmati sumbevbhken [the deception arises from the inca-
pacity to tell which predicates have the same attributes as their subjects] ».
Further terminological confirmation is readily to be found :
1a. sumbaivnw ≈ kathgorevw → Aristotelis topica, J. Brunschwig (ed.), Les Belles 
Lettres, Paris 2007, vii, 1, 152a 33-37 : « e[ti ejk tw`n touvtoi~ sumbebhkovtwn kai; oi|~ tau`ta 
sumbevbhken ejpiskopei`n: o{sa ga;r qatevrw/ sumbevbhke, kai; qatevrw/ dei `sumbebhkevnai, 
kai; oi|~ qavteron aujtw`n sumbevbhke, kai; qavteron dei `sumbebhkevnai. eij dev ti touvtwn 
diafwnei`, dh`lon o{ti ouj taujtav [moreover one has to examine things <which are the 
7 Others, in return, have rejected it : cf. A. Bäck, Philoponus on the Fallacy of  Accident, 
« Ancient Philosophy », 7 (1987), p. 131, Aristotle’s Theory of  Predication, Brill, Leiden 2000, pp. 
256-259 and Mistakes of  Reason. Practical Reasoning and the Fallacy of  Accident, « Phronesis », 54 
(2009), pp. 101-104 ; P. Fait, Aristotele. Le confutazioni sofistiche, Laterza, Roma 2007, pp. 115-116 ; 
D. Botting, Fallacies of  Accident, cit., p. 271. 
8 D. Zaslawsky, Le sophisme comme anomalie, in B. Cassin (ed.), Le plaisir de parler. Etudes de 
sophistique comparée, Editions de Minuit, Paris 1986, p. 192. 
9 L.-A. Dorion, Aristote. Les réfutations sophistiques, cit., p. 233, note 57. 
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same> from the point of  view of  their predicates (sumbebhkovta) and of  what they 
are predicated of  (sumbaivnw). In fact, whatever is predicated of  either one has to be 
predicated of  the other and of  whatever either one is predicated the other one has to 
be predicated too. If  there is discrepancy in any of  these respects, clearly those things 
are not the same] ».
1b. kathgorevw ≈ sumbaivnw → Aristotelis topica, vii, 1, 152b 25-29 : « kaqovlou d∆ eijpei`n 
ejk tw`n oJpwsou`n eJkatevrou kathgoroumevnwn kai; w|n tau`ta kathgorei`tai skopei`n ei[ 
pou diafwnei`Ú o{sa ga;r qatevrou kathgorei`tai, kai; qatevrou kathgorei`sqai dei`, kai; 
w|n qavteron kathgorei`tai, kai; qavteron kathgorei`sqai dei `[generally speaking, one 
should look things <which are the same> from the point of  view of  their predicates 
(kathgorouvmena) and of  what they are predicated of  (kathgorevw), in order to estab-
lish if  there is any discrepancy. In fact, whatever is predicated of  either one has to be 
predicated of  the other and of  whatever either one is predicated the other one has to 
be predicated too] ».
The symmetrical shift between the two verbs in the wording of  Aristotle’s 
topical rule to follow in order to establish whether or not two things are the 
same clearly indicates that sumbaivnw is a lexical variation of  kathgorevw.
2. sumbebhkov~ ≈ kathgorouvmenon → Aristotelis analytica posteriora, W.D. Ross (ed.), 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1949, i, 4, 73b 8-10 : « ta; me;n dh; mh; kaq∆ uJpokeimevnou kaq∆ 
auJta; levgw, ta; de; kaq∆ uJpokeimevnou sumbebhkovta [I call “kath’hauta” things that 
are not predicated of  a subject and “sumbebêkota” those which are predicated of  a 
subject] ».
It is quite plain that – according to this peculiar sense of  their opposition – 
kaq∆ auJtav and sumbebhkovta are sorted out on the grounds that the latters are 
predicated of  a subject, whereas the formers are not predicated at all. What 
appears to be relevant at this juncture is less whether a predicate is an acciden-
tal or an essential feature of  its subject, but the very fact of  predication : an 
« accident » is just something that may be said of  something else.
The strongest evidence available, however, is provided by Aristotle’s choice 
of  predicates. As a matter of  fact, one can hardly see what else Aristotle might 
mean by saying that Socrates happens to be a man or a triangle happens to be 
a figure. 10 Socrates may well be accidentally bald or potbellied but definitely 
he is not a man by accident, and still Aristotle says « dia; to; sumbebhkevnai 
tou`ton ei\nai a[nqrwpon » (Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 5, 166b 35-36). A triangle 
is a figure, it does not happen to be one as it happens to be equilateral or isos-
celes, and still Aristotle says « sumbevbhke d∆ aujtw/ `schvmati ei\nai » (Aristotelis 
sophistici elenchi, 6, 168b 1).
10 Both texts will be studied hereafter, in section 4 and 3 respectively.
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2. 2. Aristotle’s unified account (and solution) of  the fallacy of  accident
According to its definition, the fallacy of  accident occurs when a predicate is 
said to belong (uJpavrcein) likewise (oJmoivw~) to a subject and to one of  its predi-
cates (tw/ `pravgmati kai; tw/ `sumbebhkovti) :
Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 5, 166b 28-32 : « oiJ me;n ou\n para; to; sumbebhko;~ paralogis-
moiv eijsin o{tan oJmoivw~ oJtiou`n ajxiwqh`/ tw/ `pravgmati kai; tw/ `sumbebhkovti uJpavrcein. 
ejpei; ga;r tw/ `aujtw/ `polla; sumbevbhken, oujk ajnavgkh pa`si toi`~ kathgoroumevnoi~ kai; 
kaq∆ ou| kathgorei`tai taujta; pavnta uJpavrcein [fallacies of  “accident” occur when a 
predicate whatsoever is believed to belong in the same way to a thing and to something 
that is predicated of  it. Since many attributes are predicated of  the same thing, it is not 
necessary that all the attributes belong both to the thing and to all of  its predicates] ».
Problems with predicates arise when one is led to think that, as a rule, a sub-
ject and its attributes share the same ones. Such predicaments are likely to 
take two forms : on the one hand, one may believe that what is said of  a sub-
ject may be said of  its predicates as well. On the other hand, one may believe 
that what is said about the predicate can be said about its subject too. As we 
shall see, this reciprocity – which matches Aristotle’s wording enough or, at 
least, is not ruled out by it – is definitely implied by his examples.
Medieval and contemporary 11 commentators alike have recognised that the 
transitivity goes both ways :
Anonymi Commentarium ii, 42.1-3 : « to; “oJmoivw~” ajnti; tou `to; uJpavrcon tw/ `sumbebhkovti 
uJpavrcein kai; tw/ `pravgmati kai; e[mpalin to; uJpavrcon tw/ `pravgmati uJpavrcein kai; tw/ `
sumbebhkovti [“likewise” stands both for the attribute of  the predicate belonging to 
the thing and for the attribute of  the thing belonging to the predicate] ».
Anonymi summa sophisticorum elenchorum, 356.1-8 : « secundum accidens ergo fiunt 
paralogismi, ut dicit Aristoteles, quando quodlibet similiter fuerit assignatum 
inesse rei subiectae et accidenti, id est praedicato, et e converso, id est quando idem 
assignatur convenire accidenti sive praedicato, quod inest et rei subiectae [as Aristotle 
says, fallacies of  accident occur when something whatsoever is similarly said to belong 
both to the underlying thing and to the accident, that is to say to the predicate, or – 
the other way round – when it is said to fit the accident, that is to say the predicate, 
to which it belongs, and the underlying thing] ».
Anonymi Cantabrigiensis commentarium in Aristotelis sophisticos elenchos, 89vb 19-21 : « ut 
dicatur fallacia secundum accidens deceptio proveniens ex omissione \habitudinis/ 
unius praedicabilis ad aliud sive praedicati ad subiectum sive subiecti ad praedicatum 
[what we call the fallacy of  accident is a deception which arises from disregarding the 
relation of  one predicate to the other, whether this relation is the predicate’s relation 
to the subject or the subject’s relation to the predicate] ».
11 H.W.B. Joseph, Introduction to Logic, cit., p. 587 ; D. Ross, Aristotle, Methuen, London 
1923, p. 58 ; L.-A. Dorion, Aristote. Les réfutations sophistiques, cit., p. 235, note 235. 
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Anonymi fallacie londinenses, 669.6-9 : « fallacia secundum accidens est deceptio 
proveniens ex obmissa habitudine praedicati ad subiectum, vel econverso, quia haec 
fallacia provenit tam ex obmissa habitudine subiecti ad praedicatum quam ex obmissa 
habitudine praedicati ad subiectum [the fallacy of  accident is a deception which arises 
from disregarding the relation either of  the predicate to the subject or of  the subject 
to the predicate, for such a fallacy arises as much from a neglected relation of  the 
subject to the predicate than from a neglected relation of  the predicate to the subject] ».
Guillelmi de Montibus ( ?) fallaciae, 16.1-7 : « incidit autem haec fallacia in argumen- 
tatione quandoque aliquid assignatur subiecto quod non potest assignari praedicato 
vel e converso. Est enim fallacia secundum accidens deceptio proveniens ex omissa 
habitudine praedicati ad subiectum vel e converso [such a fallacy occurs in arguments 
which ascribe to the subject what cannot be ascribed to the predicate and vice versa. As 
a matter of  fact, the fallacy of  accident is a deception which arises from disregarding 
the relation either of  the predicate to the subject or of  the subject to the predicate] ».
Anonymi salmaticensis-florentini quaestiones super Sophisticos elenchos, S. Ebbesen (ed.), 
Incertorum auctorum quaestiones super Sophisticos elenchos, G.E.C. Gad, Copenhagen 
1977, q. 84, 194.24-31 : « accidens est aliquo modo idem subiecto de quo dicitur et aliquo 
modo non, et sic sumitur accidens in fallacia accidentis, ut dicit Commentator, et 
secundum hoc dicit modos accidentis : uno modo ex eo quod aliquid quod inest 
praedicato denotatur inesse subiecto, ut “homo est animal, sed animal est genus, 
ergo homo est genus” ; alio modo ex eo quod illud quod inest subiecto denotatur 
inesse praedicato, ut “Socrates est homo, Socrates est individuum, ergo homo est 
individuum” ; et sic duo modi principales sunt » [the “accident” is, in a way, the same 
as the thing it is predicated of  and, in another way, it is not. As the Commentator 
has it, this is how “accident” has to be understood in the fallacy of  the same name 
and how its moods have to be assigned therein. One arises from the fact that what is 
attributed to the predicate is meant to be predicated of  the subject as well, as in : “man 
is an animal, but animal is a genus, therefore man is a genus”. Another arises from the 
fact that what is attributed to the subject is attributed to the predicate as well, as in : 
“Socrates is a man, Socrates is an individual, therefore man is an individual”. This is 
why there are two main moods of  the fallacy of  accident] ».
A diagram – whose triangular form is reminiscent of  a drawing in manuscript Parisi-
nus graecus 1845, 178v – will help us get an overall picture of  the fallacy, which we are 
going to implement with Aristotle’s examples :
where P stands for pra`gma (a subject), S1 for sumbebhkov~ (a predicate said 
of  subject P) and S2 for another sumbebhkov~ (a second predicate presumed 
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to be said both of  subject P and of  predicate S1). The continuous line (→) 
means that the predicative relation is assumed to be the case, the dotted lines 
( ) indicate that the predicative relations may or may not apply. As a matter 
of  fact – contrary to the relation of  the first predicate (S1) to its subject (P), 
which is always the case (→) – the relations of  the second attribute (S2), which 
is believed to belong both to the subject (P) and the first attribute (S1), does 
not apply ( ) at least one time out of  two, since :
Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 24, 179a 36-37 : « oujk ajnavgkh to; kata; tou `sumbebhkovto~ 
kai; kata; tou `pravgmato~ ajlhqeuvesqai [what is either true of  the predicate or of  the 
subject is not necessarily true of  the other] ».
As a consequence, interlocutors are accident prone whenever they fail to fig-
ure out what is the same and what is different, what is one and what is many 
and, more to the point, which attributes turn out to have the same predicates 
as their subjects :
Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 7, 169b 3-6 : « ã169a 22 : hJ d’ ajpavth givnetaiÃ tw`n de; para; 
to; sumbebhko;~ dia; to; mh; duvnasqai diakrivnein to; taujto;n kai; to; e{teron, kai; e}n kai; 
pollav, mhde; toi`~ poivoi~ tw`n kathgorhmavtwn pavnta taujta; kai; tw/ `pravgmati sumbev- 
bhken [in fallacies of  accident the deception arises from the incapacity to distinguish 
what is the same and what is different, what is one and what is many, as well as from 
the incapacity to tell which predicates have the same attributes as their subjects] ».
Now, the unscrupulous questioner takes advantage of  the fact that there is no 
easy way to know beforehand when this happens to be the case or not : 12
Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 24, 179a 27-30 : « ejpei; ga;r ajdiovristovn ejsti to; povte lektevon 
ejpi; tou `pravgmato~ o{tan ejpi; tou `sumbebhkovto~ uJpavrcv, kai; ejp∆ ejnivwn me;n dokei `kai; 
fasivn, ejp∆ ejnivwn d∆ ou[ fasin ajnagkai`on ei\nai [for it is indeterminate when the predi-
cate that belongs to the predicate must be said of  the thing, sometimes this seems to 
be the case and it is said to be so, sometimes it is said that it is not necessary] ».
12 Puzzles about identity are a tricky business indeed and they have received a good 
deal of  well-deserved scholarly attention. Among studies concerned with the problem 
in the Sophistici elenchi, we shall mention : N.P. White, Aristotle on Sameness and Oneness, 
« The Philosophical Review », 80 (1971), pp. 177-197, F.D. Miller, Did Aristotle have the Concept 
of  Identity ?, « The Philosophical Review », 82 (1973), pp. 483-490, K.T. Barnes, Aristotle on 
Identity and its Problems, « Phronesis », 22 (1977), pp. 48-62, F.J. Pelletier, Sameness and Refer-
ential Opacity Aristotle, « Nous », 13 (1979), pp. 283-311, G.B. Matthews, Accidental Unities, in 
M. Schofield and M. Craven Nussbaum (ed.), Language and Logos, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1982, pp. 223-240, F.A. Lewis, Accidental Sameness in Aristotle, « Philosophi-
cal Studies », 42 (1982), pp. 1-36, C.J.F. Williams, Aristotle’s Theory of  Descriptions, « The Philo-
sophical Review », 94 (1985), pp. 63-80, M. Mignucci, Puzzles about Identity. Aristotle and His 
Greek Commentators, cit., pp. 57-97, E. Gobbo, Identity and the Predicables in Aristotle’s Topics, 
« Topoi », 19 (2000), pp. 83-98, M. Mariani, Numerical Identity and Accidental Predication in 
Aristotle, « Topoi », 19 (2000), pp. 99-110, P. Fait, Aristotele e i paralogismi dell’identità, cit., pp. 
205-226. 
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Wherefore the general solution Aristotle advocates, namely an unrestricted 
dismissal of  the alleged conclusion, which should give pause to any opponent, 
whether or not he is a dishonest one. As Aristotle himself  puts it :
Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 24, 179a 30-31 : « rJhtevon ou\n sumbibasqevnto~ oJmoivw~ pro;~ 
a{panta~ o{ti oujk ajnagkai`on, e[cein de; dei `profevrein to; “oi|on” [one should therefore, 
once the conclusion has been reached, deny in every case alike that it is necessary. 
Still, one must have an example to offer] ».
In fact, Aristotle has several. They all seem to follow a similar pattern, which 
is important to ascertain given that he discourages multiple or hybrid solu-
tions :
Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 24, 179a 26-27 : « pro;~ de; tou;~ para; to; sumbebhko;~ miva me;n 
hJ aujth; luvsi~ pro;~ a{panta~ [in dealing with arguments that turn upon the predicate, 
one and the same solution meets all cases] ».
For the sake of  clarity, I’ll resort again to the above diagram in order to show 
that all of  Aristotle’s examples of  reasonings that fail to prove that all predica-
tive relations apply at the same time fit into the same scheme and are to be di-
vided in two sets according to their inability to settle that either S2 predicated 
of  S1 (S2 → S1) or S2 predicated of  P (S2 → P) is the case. 13
3. Aristotle’s standard examples of the fallacy of accident
Let’s study first the examples that fit the second scenario : S2 is predicated of  S1, 
but it is not the case that S2 is to be predicated of  P (S2 → S1, but not S2 → P).
1. Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 24, 179a 33 : « a\r∆ oi\da~ o} mevllw se ejrwta`n ; [do you know 
what I am about to ask you ?] ».
In the first example, P is « the good », S1 « to be asked » and S2 « to be unknown 
to you ». Now, I am entitled to say of  P (the good) that it is what I’ll be asking 
you about (S1 → P : S1 is predicated of  P) and I am entitled to say that what 
I am going to ask you about is unknown to you (S2 → S1 : S2 is predicated of  
S1), but I cannot infer from these premises that what the good is is unknown 
13 One pattern is better than many, especially if  the supernumerary ones are a classifica-
tory device which allows interpreters to dump unwieldy examples (cf. e.g. A. Bueno, Aristo-
tle, the Fallacy of  Accident and the Nature of  Predication. A Historical Inquiry, cit., p. 9). 
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to you because you don’t know what I’ll be asking you about (S2   P : S2 is 
not to be predicated of  P).
2. Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 24, 179a 33-34 : « a\r∆ oi\da~ to;n prosiovnta, h] to;n ejgkeka-
lummevnon ; [do you know who is approaching ? do you know the man in disguise ?] ».
In the second example, P is « Coriscus », S1 « to be – either – approaching – or 
– in disguise » and S2 « to be unknown to you ». As before, one may say about 
P (Coriscus) that he’s either approaching or concealed by a veil (S1 → P : S1 
is predicated of  P) and one may also say that you do not know who’s either 
approaching or concealed by a veil (S2 → S1 : S2 is also predicated of  S1), but 
one cannot draw the conclusion that Coriscus is unknown to you because the 
man approaching or concealed by a veil is unknown to you (S2   P : S2 is not 
to be predicated of  P).
3. Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 24, 179a 33-34 : « a\ra ta; ojligavki~ ojlivga ojlivga ; [a small 
number <multiplied> a small number of  times is a small number ?] ».
In the third example, P is « a small number », S1 « <to be multiplied> a small 
number of  times » and S2 « to be a small number ». It is possible both to multi-
ply P (a small number) a small number of  times (S1 → P : S1 is predicated of  
P) and to say that a small number of  times is a small number (S2 → S1 : S2 is 
also predicated of  S1), but this is not ground enough for asserting that a small 
number is still a small number once it has been multiplied a small number of  
times (S2   P : S2 is not to be predicated of  P), all the more so if  the multipli-
cation is performed more than once. 14
If  we now look at the other half  of  the diagram, we have the examples that 
match the first scenario : S2 is predicated of  P, but it is not the case that S2 is 
to be predicated of  S1 (S2 → P, but not S2 → S1).
4. Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 24, 179a 34-35 : « a\r∆ oJ ajndria;~ sovn ejstin e[rgon, h] so;~ oJ 
kuvwn pathvr ; [Is the statue your work or the dog your father ?] ».
5. Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 24, 180a 1-4 : « “a\r’ ejsti; tou`to sovn” “naiv”. “e[sti de; tou`to 
tevknon: so;n a[ra tou`to tevknon”. ajll∆ ouj so;n tevknon o{ti sumbevbhken ei\nai kai; so;n kai; 
tevknon [“is he yours <slave> ?”, “yes”, “he is a child ; then he is your child”. For he 
happens to be both yours and a child, this does not make him your child] ».
14 As the reminder of  the example in Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 24, 179b 34-35 is likely to 
suggest : « a{pa~ ajriqmo;~ ojlivgo~ [every number is a small number] ». 
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In examples four and five, P is, in turn, « a statue », « a dog » and « a slave » ; S1 
« to be a piece of  work », « to be a father », « to be a child » ; and S2 « to be yours ». 
One cannot reach the conclusion that the statue is your work, the dog is your 
father and the slave is your son because the first happens to be a piece of  work 
that belongs to you, the second a father that also belongs to you and the third 
a child that you own. Nothing prevents one from saying that the statue is 
both, namely that it is a piece of  work (S1 → P : S1 is predicated of  P) and that 
it is yours (S2 → P : S2 is also predicated of  P), but one can hardly infer from 
these premises that the statue is your work (S2   S1 : S2 is not to be predicated 
of  S1). The same goes for the dog and the slave : one has every right to say both 
that it is your dog and he is your slave (S1 → P : S1 is predicated of  P) and that 
the dog is a father and the slave is a child (S2 → P : S2 is also predicated of  P) 
but these premises do not warrant the conclusion that the dog is your father 
and the slave is your son (S2   S1 : S2 is not to be predicated of  S1).
6. Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 6, 168a 40 - 168b 2 : « oujd∆ eij to; trivgwnon [168b] duoi`n 
ojrqai`n i[sa~ e[cei, sumbevbhke d∆ aujtw/ `schvmati ei\nai h] prwvtw/ h] ajrch`/, o{ti sch`ma h] 
ajrch; h] prw`ton tou`tov ejstin [nor if  the triangle has its angles equal to two right an-
gles, and it happens to be a figure or an element or a principle, <does it follows> that 
a figure, a principle or an element have the same character] ».
In the sixth example, P is « a triangle », S1 « to be a figure or an element or a 
principle » and S2 « to have its angles equal to two right angles ». One is allowed 
to say both that the triangle is a figure or an element or a principle (S1 → P : 
S1 is predicated of  P) and that its angles are equal to two right angles (S2 → 
P : S2 is also predicated of  P), but one cannot conclude on such terms that to 
be a figure or an element or a principle is to have its angles equal to two right 
angles (S2   S1 : S2 is not to be predicated of  S1).
4. Aristotle’s star examples of the fallacy of accident
Let’s turn now to the examples I kept for last even though they come first in 
the text :
7. Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 5, 166b 32-36 : « oi|on “eij oJ Korivsko~ e{teron ajnqrwvpou, 
aujto;~ auJtou `e{tero~Ú e[sti ga;r a[nqrwpo~”. h] eij Swkravtou~ e{tero~, oJ de; Swkravth~ 
a[nqrwpo~, e{teron ajnqrwvpou fasi;n wJmologhkevnai dia; to; sumbebhkevnai ou| e[fhsen 
e{teron ei\nai, tou`ton ei\nai a[nqrwpon [for instance, if  Coriscus is other than man, he 
is other than himself, for he is a man ; otherwise, if  he is other than Socrates, since 
Socrates is a man, they pretend that it has been admitted that he is other than man 
because of  the fact that man is predicated of  Socrates and Coriscus is said to be other 
than Socrates] ».
Obviously, the main question is whether or not these examples follow the 
same pattern as those encountered so far. At a guess, the most likely answer 
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would be that they do, for the pattern is modelled on Aristotle’s definition of  
the fallacy of  accident and the examples we are talking about follow it imme-
diately in Aristotle’s text. Scholars however do not guess and, in this particular 
case, they appear to have favoured a rather counter-intuitive solution to the 
problem. In fact, although Aristotle repeatedly took issue in chapter 24 with 
those who resorted to a linguistic ambiguity (dittovn) in order to explain away 
fallacies of  accident, Byzantine and Latin commentators believed more often 
than not that the snag in these arguments stems precisely from a linguistic 
ambiguity. 15 They all noticed that, at different stages of  the argument, « man » 
stands for different things : a particular man in one premise (« Coriscus is a 
man ») ; man as such in the other (« Coriscus is not the universal man, is other 
than man himself »). Since the middle term’s reference varies between prem-
ises, the word « man » turns out to be equivocal and thereby forbids the syllo-
gism to bring about its intended conclusion.
Digression. Truth be told, some of  them should have known better than to believe 
that this is proof  enough that a linguistic fallacy is involved (be it homonymy or figure 
of  speech). As a matter of  fact, such a reading rests on a confusion between what Latin 
masters called the causa apparentiae and the causa defectus of  a fallacy. Westerners were 
ordinarily well aware of  the fact that there is a distinction to be made between the 
way an argument goes wrong and the way it fools us. Accordingly, they differentiated 
between what they called a principium motivum or a causa apparentiae (what gives an 
argument a respectable appearance) and a causa defectus or non existentiae (the reason 
why – despite looking good – it is defective or fails to deduce its conclusion). 16 All of  
15 In recent times as well, W.D. Ross, Introduction, in Aristotelis metaphysica, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1924, p. lxxxviii (followed by K.T. Barnes, Aristotle on Identity and its Problems, 
cit., p. 57), L.-A. Dorion, Aristote. Les réfutations sophistiques, cit., pp. 236-237, notes 59-60 and 
P. Fait, Aristotele. Le confutazioni sofistiche, cit., p. 117 have held similar views in so far they 
suspected the ejsti (Ross), a[nqrwpo~ (Dorion) and e{tero~ (Fait) of  the argument to be am-
biguous. 
16 The distinction is virtually ubiquitous in the Latin tradition. As usual, Peter of  Spain 
set it out very clearly : « principium autem motivum sive causa apparentiae in qualibet falla-
cia est quod movet ad credendum quod non est. Principium vero defectus sive causa falsita-
tis est quod facit creditum esse falsum [in any fallacy, the principle or the cause that produce 
the illusion is what leads to believe what is not ; in return, the principle that produces the de-
fect of  the argument or the cause of  its falseness is what makes false what is believed <to be 
true>] » (Petri hispani portugalensis tractatus, L.M. de Rijk (ed.), Peter of  Spain (Petrus Hispanus 
Portugalensis). Tractatus called afterwards Summule logicales, Van Gorcum, Assen 1972, vii, 
98.13-16). Lambert of  Auxerre (Lagny) put it to best use, since he organised his investigation 
of  each of  Aristotle’s thirteen fallacies according to two questions, namely what is – in each 
and every case – the causa apparentiae and what is the causa defectus (cf. Summa Lamberti, F. 
Alessio (ed.), La Nuova Italia, Firenze 1971, vii, 173.28-35 for the accident). On the subject, cf. 
S. Ebbesen The Way Fallacies were Treated in Scholastic Logic, « Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen 
Age Grec et Latin », 55 (1987), pp. 115-117 ; R. Huelsen, Concrete Accidental Terms and the Fal-
lacy of  Figure of  Speech, in N. Kretzmann (ed.), Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy, 
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which makes excellent sense, notably for two reasons : first of  all, Aristotle makes it 
clear from the start that his main concern with sophistic arguments is not so much 
they are poor arguments but rather that they manage not to appear so. 17 Secondly 
and foremost, their place in Aristotle’s classification depends on the way the illusion 
works : for instance – as Aristotle makes it pretty clear 18 – « homonymy », « amphiboly » 
and « figure of  speech » all involve a double meaning, but they are not deceitful in the 
same way. And this is indeed why they are distinct fallacies : they may well share the 
same causa defectus, but – their causa apparentiae being different – they are different 
fallacies. 19 This is why one should be very careful about introducing an ambiguity of  
sorts in a discussion whose focus is the fallacy of  accident. All the more so, one might 
add, that the fallacy of  accident is a sophism outside language or independent from 
expression, that is to say it is not expected to resort to a linguistic feature of  any kind 
(and ambiguity – no need to say – is definitely one).
As a matter of  fact, at least a few Latin commentators resisted such temptation by 
recalling that what produces the illusion that a fallacy is a sound argument – the causa 
apparentiae precisely – is the very same thing that makes it the fallacy it is :
Anonymi salmaticensis-florentini quaestiones super sophisticos elenchos q. 76, 172.1-7 : « con-
sequenter quaeritur quid sit causa apparentiae huius fallaciae, quia Aristoteles vid-
etur velle quod similitudo dictionis ad dictionem, et ideo quaeritur utrum hoc sit 
Kluwer Academic Publications, Dordrecht 1988, p. 177 ; A. Tabarroni, Figure of  Speech and 
Aristotle’s Division of  Fallacies, in C. Cellucci, M.C. Di Maio and G. Roncaglia (ed.), Logica e 
filosofia della scienza, ets, Pisa 1994, p. 15. 
17 Cf. namely Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 1, 164a 20-26 and 165a 18-19. Albert the Great, 
Giles of  Rome, Simon of  Faversham and the Anonymus pragensis all stressed the fact that 
where there is no such appearance there’s no fallacy either (cf. Alberti magni expositio sophis-
ticorum elenchorum, P. Jammy (ed.), C. Prost, Lyon 1651, 850b 52-53 ; Aegidii romani expositio 
super libros elenchorum, per Bonetum Locatellum, Venetiis 1496, 58vb ; Simonis de Faverisham 
quaestiones novae super libro elenchorum, S. Ebbesen, T. Izbicki, J. Longeway, F. del Punta, 
E. Serene, E. Stump (ed.), Pontifical Institute of  Mediaeval Studies, Toronto 1984, q. 10, 
128.122-124 and q. 16, 142.22 - 143.30 ; Anonymi pragensis quaestiones super Aristotelis sophisticos 
elenchos, D. Murè (ed.), http ://padis.uniroma1.it/getfile.py ?recid=707, 2009, q. 35, 84.2-7). 
18 Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 6, 168a 23-25 : « tw`n me;n ga;r ejn th`/ levxei oiJ mevn eijsi para; to; 
dittovn, oi\on h[ te oJmwnumiva kai; oJ lovgo~ kai; hJ oJmoioschmosuvnh [some fallacies depending on 
expression have to do with a double meaning, namely homonymy, amphiboly and figure of  
speech] ». 
19 This particular issue is often discussed by medieval authors. Cf. e.g. Anonymi salmati-
censis-florentini quaestiones super sophisticos elenchus, q. 80, 179.1-3 and 179.21 - 181.59 ; Anonymi 
cordubensis quaestiones super sophisticos elenchos, S. Ebbesen (ed.), Incertorum auctorum quaes-
tiones super sophisticos elenchos, G.E.C. Gad, Copenhagen 1977, q. 820, 307.24 - 308.50 ; Ano-
nymi C&G 611-ii quaestiones in sophisticos elenchos, S. Ebbesen (ed.), Texts on Equivocation. Part 
ii. Ca. 1250 - ca. 1310, « Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin », 68 (1998), 183.17-30 ; 
Ioannis Duns Scoti quaestiones super librum elenchorum Aristotelis, R. Andrews, O. Bychkov, S. 
Ebbesen, G. Etzkorn, G. Gal, R. Green, T. Noone, R. Plevano, A. Traver (ed.), The Francis-
can Institute, St. Bonaventure 2004, q. 42, 465.7-12 and 19-20 ; Radulphi britonis quaestiones su-
per sophisticos elenchos, S. Ebbesen (ed.), « Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin », 
53 (1986), q. 32, 120.34-36. 
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verum. Et videtur quod non, quia quando mutatur quale quid in hoc aliquid est fig-
ura dictionis, non tamen est similitudo dictionis ad dictionem, nam Socrates ad spe-
ciem nullam habet similitudinem in voce [therefore the question arises as to what 
produces the illusion of  this fallacy, since Aristotle seems to take it to be the similar-
ity between one expression and another. The question arises as to whether or not 
this is true. And it appears it is not. For, even if  the permutation between a qualified 
and a this something is associated with the figure of  speech, no similarity between 
expressions is involved, since the expressions “Socrates” and “species” do not have 
any resemblance] ». 20
Be that as it may, the fact remains that, by anyone’s standard, this is a rather 
elegant solution. It also had the advantage of  being tailored to fit the logical 
and metaphysical background of  ancient and medieval commentators.
Byzantines. A scholium from the anonymous corpus, whose materials 
– as in this case – were extensively incorporated by Michael of  Ephesus in 
his own commentary, attests that to back up such an explanation Byzantines 
availed themselves of  the traditional distinction between the sunamfovtero~ 
or sugkatatetagmevno~ tw/ `Korivskw/ a[nqrwpo~ (the coordinated, compound-
ed or combined man : that is to say the man embodied by the particular man, 
e.g. Coriscus) and the ajkatavtakto~ a[nqrwpo~ oJ kaqovlou (the unranged or 
undistributed man : that is to say the universal man or man as universal) : 21
20 The example is a very ancient one (references below). It belongs to the first family 
studied above (examples 1, 2 and 3) : « Socrates est homo, sed homo est species, ergo Socra-
tes est species », where « Socrates » is P, « to be a man » is S1 and « to be a species » is S2 (S1 → P 
and S2 → S1, but not S2 → P : « Socrates is a man » and « man is a species », but not « Socrates 
is a species »). 
21 The distinction goes back at least as far as Porphyry, as attested by Simplicius : « kaiv 
fhsin oJ Porfuvrio~, o{ti ditth; hJ ejpivnoia tou `zwv/ou, hJ me;n tou `katatetagmevnou, hJ de; tou `
ajkatatavktou: kathgorei`tai ou\n to; aJkatavtakton tou `katatetagmevnou, kai; tauvth/ e{terovn 
ejstin [Porphyry says that the notion of  animal is double : one refers to the coordinated 
<animal>, the other to the uncoordinated. The latter is predicated of  the former and, 
under this respect, they are different] » (Simplicii in Aristotelis categorias commentarium, 
K. Kalbfleisch (ed.), Reimer, Berlin 1907, 53.6-9). Cf. A.C. Lloyd, Neoplatonists’ Account of  
Predication and Medieval Logic, in M.P.M. Schuhl and P. Hadot (a cura di), Le néoplatonisme. 
Royaumont, 9-13 juin 1969, Editions du cnrs, Paris 1971, pp. 359-362 ; S. Ebbesen, Commentators 
and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi, cit., pp. 224-225 ; C. Luna, Commentaire, in 
P. Hoffmann, Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catégories d’Aristote. Chapitres 2-4, Les Belles 
Lettres, Paris 2001, pp. 448-452. Simplicius is – in all likelihood – quoting from Porphyry’s 
lost commentary on Categories (ad Gedalios), since the latter does not dwell on the prob-
lem in his extant questions-commentary. The distinction was passed down to the Latins 
by Magister Iacobus ( James of  Venice), quoted as early as the anonymous Summa sophis-
ticorum elenchorum, 357.15-23 : « ut cum dico “Socrates est homo, sed homo est species, ergo 
Socrates est species” : sophisma est secundum accidens secundum illum <scil. Magistrum 
Iacobum>, quia “homo” in prima propositione significat illam speciem coniunctam illi in-
dividuo, scilicet Socratei ; sed postea, cum dico “homo est species”, significat illam speciem 
non ut iunctam alicui individuo sed seorsum vel separatim [When one says “Socrates is a 
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Anonymi Commentarium ii, 43.15-19 = Ps.-Alexandri II (Michaeli Ephesii) in Aristotelis so-
phisticos elenchos commentarium, 38.11-14 : « oJ levgwn “oJ Korivsko~ a[nqrwpo~” to; sunam-
fovteron lambavnei, to;n sugkatatetagmevnon tw/ `Korivskw/ a[nqrwpon kai; to;n Korivs-
kon, ejn de; th`/ “a[nqrwpo~ e{tero~ Korivskou” to;n ajkatavtakton a[nqrwpon to;n kaqovlou 
[he who says “the man Coriscus” speaks of  the compounded <man>, that which is 
combined to Coriscus, that is to say Coriscus. The expression “the man other than 
Coriscus” <refers to> the undistributed man, that is to say the universal] ».
Latins. Starting from Magister Albericus, 22 Latins scholars made the most of  
the fact that the ambiguity between the universal and the particular man is a 
textbook case of  variata suppositio of  the middle term. 23 This solution occurs 
in the anonymous Fallaciae vindobonenses 24 and Tractatus de sophistica argumen-
tatione (dialectica monacensis), 25 Peter of  Spain, 26 the Anonymus Monacen-
sis (quoted below), Roger Bacon, 27 Lambert of  Auxerre (Lagny), 28 Thomas 
Aquinas ( ?), 29 the Anonymus salmaticensis-florentinus (also quoted below), 
Giles of  Rome, 30 the anonymous note about accident in Ms Oxford Bodleyan 
Library Digby 24, 31 Duns Scot 32 and John Buridan (quoted below as well) :
Anonymi monacensis commentarium in sophisticos elenchos, L. Gazziero (ed.), The Latin 
« Third Man ». A Survey and Edition of  Texts from the xiiith Century, « Cahiers de 
l’Institut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin », 81 (2012), 42 : « quaeritur de isto paralogismo : 
“homo est diversus ab homine ; Callias est homo ; ergo, Callias est diversus a se”, 
man ; man is a species ; therefore, Socrates is a species”, the sophism involved is, following 
Master James, one of  accident, since “man” in the first sentence refers to the human spe-
cies compounded with the individual, namely Socrates. On the other hand, when one says 
“man is a species” the expression refers to the human species by itself  or separated and not 
combined with an individual whatsoever] ». 
22 Anonymi summa sophisticorum elenchorum, 357.25 - 358.4. 
23 Cf. S.G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning. Language and the World in the Sophistical 
Refutations, State University of  New York Press, Albany 2003, pp. 128-129 for a less than ac-
curate, source-allergic account of  the same story. 
24 Anonymi fallaciae vindobonenses, L.M. de Rijk (ed.), Logica Modernorum, Van Gorcum, 
Assen 1962, 527.11-29. 
25 Anonymi tractatus de sophistica argumentatione (dialectica monacensis), L.M. de Rijk (ed.), 
Logica Modernorum, Van Gorcum, Assen 1967, 585.23-26. 
26 Petri hispani portugalensis tractatus, vii, 106, 148.19-293. 
27 Rogeri Baconi summulae dialectices, A. de Libera (ed.), Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et 
Littéraire du Moyen Age, 54 (1987), p. 261, 627-629. 
28 Summa Lamberti, vii, 181.28 - 182.11. 
29 Thomae de Aquino ( ?) de fallaciis, H.F. Dondaine (ed.), Editori di San Tommaso, Roma 
1976, ix, 411a 75-88. 
30 Aegidii romani expositio super libros elenchorum, 17ra 40-45. 
31 Anonymi de fallaciis, L.M. de Rijk (ed.), Logica Modernorum, Van Gorcum, Assen 1962, 
73.8-15. 
32 Ioannis Duns Scoti quaestiones super librum elenchorum Aristotelis, q. 44, 471.1-4. 
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quia videtur ibi esse fallacia consequentis a superiori ad inferius. Item videtur ibi esse 
paralogismus accidentis, quia homo in maiori et in minori pro alio et alio sumitur, 
quare videtur quod non sit ibi fallacia figurae dictionis [questions arise about the 
sophism “a man is different from man ; Callias is a man ; therefore, Callias is different 
from himself ”, since it appears to be a fallacy of  consequent (whose inference proceeds 
from a superior to an inferior). Moreover it appears to be a fallacy of  accident, since 
“man” stands for one thing in one premise and for another thing in the other premise ; 
wherefore it appears not to be a fallacy of  figure of  speech] ».
Anonymi salmaticensis-florentini quaestiones super Sophisticos elenchos, q. 83, 192.20-
35 : « dicendum quod fallacia accidentis non tantum fit ex variatione medii in 
<comparatione ad> maiorem et minorem extremitatem, quia cum fallacia accidentis 
accidat ex comparatione unius secundum naturas extraneas ad diversa, cum 
medium aliquando posset secundum naturas diversas comparari extremis, et maior 
extremitas aliquando secundum diversas naturas et extraneas comparatur medio et 
minori extremitati, et minor extremitas aliquando medio et maiori, ideo dico quod 
potest fieri fallacia accidentis ex diversitate cuiuscumque illorum trium. Exemplum 
autem omnium patet ; si enim sic arguatur “Coriscus est alter ab homine, Coriscus 
est homo, ergo est alter a se” hic est variatio medii ; si autem sic dicatur “omnis 
triangulus in eo quod triangulus habet tres, sed figura est triangulus, ergo figura in 
eo quod figura habet tres” hic variatur maior extremitas ; si autem sic arguatur “hoc 
est tuum, et est opus, ergo hoc est tuum opus” hic variatur li “tuum”, primo enim 
fuit li “tuum” ut possessum, modo autem “tuum” ut opus [it should be said that the 
fallacy of  accident arises no less from the variation of  the middle term in its relation 
to the major and the minor one than from a variation of  the latters. In fact, since the 
fallacy of  accident arises from the comparison of  some one thing to different things 
according to dissimilar natures, this may happen indifferently when the middle term 
is so coupled with the major and the minor terms, or when either the major term or 
the minor one is similarly related to the middle term and alternatively the minor to 
the major and the major to the minor. Examples make this clear in each case. In fact, 
if  one argues : “Coriscus is other than man ; Coriscus is a man ; therefore, he is other 
than himself ”, here is a case of  variation of  the middle term. On the other hand, if  
one says : “in so far as it is one, every triangle has three angles ; but the triangle is a 
figure ; therefore, a figure, in so far as it is one, has three angles”, here is a case of  
variation of  the major term. Again, if  one argues : “this is yours ; and this a piece of  
work ; therefore, this is your doing”, “yours” is the term which varies and means first 
“what is yours”, then “what is your doing”] ».
Ioannis Buridani quaestiones elenchorum, R. van der Lecq and H.A.G. Braakhuis (ed.), 
Ingenium, Nijmegen 1994, q. 14, 73.138-143 : « aliter potest variari medium, videlicet 
sic quod secundum eandem rationem sumitur in unaquaque premissarum, 
verificatur tamen in una earum pro uno et in alia pro alio. Et sic causat fallaciam 
accidentis, sicut hic : “ab homine Coriscus est alter ; Coriscus est homo ; ergo a 
Corisco Coriscus est alter”. In maiori enim ly “homine” verificatur pro alio, sed 
“homo” in minori verificatur pro Corisco [the middle term may vary in another 
way, namely when it is taken according to the same relation in both premises, 
but in each it is true of  different things ; which results in a fallacy of  accident, as 
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follows : “Coriscus is other than man ; Coriscus is a man ; therefore, Coriscus is 
other than Coriscus”] ».
All of  which is fair and square, so far as it goes. For there is no way this ex-
planation may be stretched enough to cover the one point that should not be 
overlooked : how does it come that of  all the examples Aristotle might have 
chosen, the very ones which follow his definition of  the fallacy of  accident 
and – for that reason – enjoy the best visibility, have no real business here 
and, if  taken seriously, are more likely to obscure the issue rather than to help 
clarify it ?
While involving less metaphysics and logical subtlety, another solution 
looks more attractive. Lambert of  Auxerre (Lagny), Albert the Great and 
Giles of  Rome were on the right track when they took notice of  the fact that 
the conclusion of  the second example (Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 5, 166b 34-
35 : « they say it has been agreed that Coriscus is other than man (e{teron ajnqr-
wvpou fasi;n wJmologhkevnai) ») is nothing else but the premise of  the first (Aris-
totelis sophistici elenchi, 5, 166b 32-33 : « Coriscus is other than man (oJ Korivsko~ 
e{teron ajnqrwvpou) ») :
Summa Lamberti, vii, 182.43-47 : « fallacia accidentis praemissae debent esse verae 
et conclusio falsa ; sed illa : “ab homine Coriscus est alter” in primo paralogismo 
Aristotelis est praemissa, in secundo conclusio. Quare videtur quod Aristoteles 
habeat eam pro vera et pro falsa, quod est impossibile [when a fallacy of  accident 
occurs, the premises have to be true and the conclusion has to be false. But “Coriscus 
is other than man” is the premise of  Aristotle’s first syllogism and the conclusion 
of  the second. It appears so that Aristotle held it both for true and false, which is 
impossible] ». 33
Alberti magni expositio sophisticorum elenchorum, 865a 67 - 865b 13 : « propter exemplum 
quod ponit Aristoteles de [865b] ista “Coriscus est alter ab homine”, et quod ponit in 
uno paralogismo pro praemissa et in altero pro conclusione, notandum quod, meo 
iudicio, haec falsa est “Coriscus est alter ab homine”, quia alter notat diversitatem, et 
in termino circa quem ponit diversitatem, notat diversitatem formalem, et tunc patet 
quod propositio est falsa. Et cum dicitur “Coriscus est alter a Socrate, Socrates autem 
homo”, cum medio comparatur homo, hoc est, Socrati attribuitur homo. Sic enim 
potest convenire Corisco alterum esse a Socrate, quum non sit idem cum Socrate 
[According to Aristotle’s example of  the fallacy of  accident, “Coriscus is other than 
man” is in turn the premise of  one sophism and the conclusion of  the other. It should 
be noted that, in my opinion, the sentence itself  is false, since in either case it refers 
to a difference which Aristotle takes to be a formal one as far as the term which it 
33 Moreover, Lambert had a similar situation in mind when discussing the relation 
between two more sophisms (of  accident, precisely !) whose conclusion and one of  the 
premises are one the counterpart of  the other : « maior enim falsa est et habet apparentiam 
a praedicto paralogismo cuius fuit conclusio [the first premise is false but it appears not to 
be so in virtue of  the first sophism, whose conclusion it is] » (142.18-19). 
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affects is concerned. It is clear then that the sentence is false. And by saying “Coriscus 
is other than Socrates, but Socrates is a man”, man is compared to the middle term, 
that is to say man is predicated of  Socrates. Thus, it befits Coriscus to be other than 
Socrates, since they are not the same] ».
Aegidii romani expositio super libros elenchorum, 17ra 58-60 : « ponit secundum para- 
logismum per quem probatur maior prioris paralogismi. Fuit enim maior praedicti 
paralogismi hic quod Coriscus est alter ab homine [Aristotle introduces a second 
sophism by means of  which he proves the premise of  the first. In fact, according to 
the premise of  the first sophism, Coriscus is other than man] ».
oJ Korivsko~ Swkravtou~ e{tero~
oJ Swkravth~ a[nqrwpo~
fe{teron ajnqrwvpou fasi;n wJmologhkevnaie
f        oJ Korivsko~ e{teron ajnqrwvpouf
oJ Korivsko~ ajnqrwvpo~
aujto;~ auJtou` e{tero~
As a matter of  fact, the symmetry between the two clauses and Aristotle’s 
wording makes it clear that the main function of  example two is to achieve 
consensus (oJmolovgei`n) around the very assumption example one takes as its 
starting point.
Once we acknowledge that Aristotle introduced the second example in or-
der to provide a suitable prosyllogism for the first, we may avoid two major 
predicaments other interpretations land themselves in :
1. First of  all, we can stop worrying about metaphysical puzzles. Coriscus 
and man are assumed to be different not in virtue of  some fancy metaphysical 
footwork, but through a straightforward procedure readers of  Aristotle’s dia-
lectic were perfectly familiar with : 34 an honest piece of  sophistry, one which 
doesn’t play highly speculative guessing games about humanity and assorted 
specimens, like : « is man other than Man ? », but goes about its business asking 
simple unchallenging questions like « is Coriscus other than Socrates ? », « Is 
Socrates a man ? ».
2. Second, we are not bound to treat example two as an unrelated instance 
of  the same fallacy-type, which it is not. In point of  fact, unlike the « Coriscus 
other than himself, etc. » argument, the « Coriscus other than Socrates, etc. » is 
not just another fallacy of  accident.
Since this may come as a surprise, let us be more specific.
The first example is cast in the same mould as the others and allows for the 
same analysis :
34 Aristotelis topica, viii, 1, 156a 7-9 : « kruvptonta de; prosullogivzesqai di∆ w\n oJ sullogis-
mo;~ tou `ejx ajrch`~ mevllei givnesqai, kai; tau`ta wJ~ plei`sta [when one is dissimulating, he had 
better establish by means of  a prosyllogism the premises through which he intends to infer 
the initial thesis and produce as many preliminary deductions as possible] ». 
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Where P is Coriscus, S1 « to be man » and S2 « to be other than » (alternatively 
Coriscus and Man) or – even better – « to be other than Coriscus tout court ». 
As usual, S1 is predicated of  P (« Coriscus is a man »). With the proviso that 
the eJterovth~ is a symmetrical relation, 35 S2 is predicated of  S1 (« man is other 
than Coriscus ») in virtue of  the prosyllogism ; wherefore the insidious conclu-
sion : S2 should be predicated of  P as well (« Coriscus is other than Coriscus » 
or « Coriscus is other than himself »).
If  we now look into the structure of  the prosyllogism, it is another matter 
entirely. The main difference is that we have no longer one single subject and 
two predicates which may or may not form a mutually compatible triad. We 
have instead two different subjects (« Socrates » and « Coriscus ») and at least as 
many predicates (« to be a man », « to be other than » alternatively Socrates or 
man). Without being altogether compelling, this suggests that the prosyllo-
gism is a fallacy of  consequent rather than a fallacy of  accident.
The text strongly supports this view, seeing that it both confirms why we 
should not mistake it for a fallacy of  accident and how we are to understand 
the consequence involved :
1. On the one hand, Aristotle himself  tells us that the fallacy of  consequent 
differs from the fallacy of  accident in that it requires more than one subject : 36
35 Even if  e{teron and aujtovn are pollacw`~ legovmena, their opposition – being mutually 
exclusive (Aristotelis metaphysica, i, 3, 1054b 15-16 : « to; me;n a[llo ajntikeimevnw~ kai; to; taujtov, 
dio; a{pan pro;~ a{pan h] taujto; h] a[llo [“other” in one sense is the opposite of  the same, for 
everything is either the same as or other than everything else] » and 1054b 25 : « pa`n ga;r h] 
e{teron h] taujto; o{ ti a]n h\/ o[n [everything that is a being is either different or the same] ») – 
implies that if  A is other than B, then B is other than A (since – precisely – they are not the 
same). Cf. Anonymi Commentarium ii, 43.33-35 : « “oJ Korivsko~ e{tero~ ajnqrwvpou” i[son ejsti; 
tw `“oJ a[nqrwpo~ e{tero~ Korivskou” [“Coriscus is other than man” and “man is other than 
Coriscus” are tantamount] ». Ps.-Alexandri I (Michaeli Ephesii) in Aristotelis sophisticos elenchos 
commentarium, 39.14-17 : « kata; de; th;n levxin eij me;n to; oJ “Korivsko~ e{teron ajnqrwvpou” wJ~ 
i[son lhfqeivh tw`/ “oJ a[nqrwpo~ e{teron Korivskou” (suvnhqe~ dev ejsti tw ` ∆Aristotevlei tou`to 
poiei`n kai; pollai`~ toiauvtai~ eJrmhneivai~ crh`sqai), safev~ ejsti to; legovmenon [Provided 
that “Coriscus is other than man” is taken to be tantamount to say that “man is other than 
Coriscus” (as Aristotle does as a matter of  routine using many similar expressions as well), 
what Aristotle says is clear] ». 
36 William of  Sherwood is likely to be the medieval master who best grasped the differ-
ence between accidens and consequens on account of  the number of  subjects involved : « non 
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Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 6, 168b 28-31 : « diafevrei de; tou `sumbebhkovto~, o{ti to; me;n 
sumbebhko;~ e[stin ejf∆ eJno;~ movnou labei`n, […], to; de; para; to; eJpovmenon ajei; ejn pleivo- 
sin [the sophism of  consequent differs from the sophism of  accident insofar as the 
accident refers to one single subject, (…) whereas the consequent always involves 
more than one] ».
Now, this is precisely what happens in the sophism at hand, where Coriscus is 
said to be other than Socrates and Socrates is said to be a man.
2. On the other hand, Aristotle gives us a valuable clue as to the kind of  con-
sequence we are dealing with :
Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 28, 181a 23-27 : « e[sti de; ditth; hJ tw`n eJpomevnwn ajkolouvqhsi~Ú 
h] ga;r wJ~ tw/ `ejn mevrei to; kaqovlou, oi|on ajnqrwvpw/ zw/`on (ajxiou`tai gavr, eij tovde meta; 
tou`de, kai; tovd∆ ei\nai meta; tou`de), h] kata; ta;~ ajntiqevsei~ (eij ga;r tovde tw/`de ajkolou-
qei`, tw/ `ajntikeimevnw/ to; ajntikeivmenon) [consequents follow in two ways : either as the 
universal follows from the particular, as for instance animal follows from man (in 
fact, one deems that if  that follows from this, it is also the case that this follows from 
that) or else according to oppositions (kata; ta;~ ajntiqevsei~) (if  this follows from 
that, the opposite of  this follows from the opposite of  that)] ».
Again, this is precisely what happens in our sophism. First we have a straight-
forward consequence where a universal (man) follows from a particular (So-
crates). Then we have a consequence from what qualifies as a form of  ajntivqe-
si~ : if  Coriscus is not Socrates or is other than Socrates, then he is not a man 
or is other than man in so far as Socrates is one.
It would appear then that a few Latin commentators – as the Anonymus 
pragensis quoted below – hit the nail on the head and solved the puzzle of  
Aristotle’s most baffling example long before it became one in the eyes of  
modern scholars :
Anonymi pragensis quaestiones super Aristotelis sophisticos elenchos, q. 32, 75.14-23 : 
« quandocumque ad antecedens sequitur consequens, si antecedens est verum, et 
consequens erit verum ; sed sequitur : “a Socrate Coriscus est alter ; ergo ab homine 
Coriscus est alter”, ut probabo, et antecedens est verum ; ergo consequens debet esse 
verum. Maior est vera. Probatio minoris, scilicet quod sequitur : “a Socrate <Coriscus 
est alter>, ergo etc.”, quia illa consequentia est bona, quando ad oppositum con- 
sequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis ; sed ad istud oppositum consequentis, 
tamen accidens et consequens [214] sunt unus locus. […]. Et hoc est quod dat intelligere 
consequenter, ubi ostendit differentiam accidentis et consequentis, quod “accidens est in 
uno solo sumere” et “consequens in pluribus” [however, the fallacy of  accident and the 
fallacy of  consequent are not the same. (…). And this is what Aristotle means next, when 
he displays the difference between the two, which is that “accident refers to one single 
subject”, while “consequent refers to more than one”] » (Introductiones magistri Guillelmi de 
Shyrewode in logicam, H. Brands and C. Kann (ed.), F. Meiner, Hamburg 1995, vi, 212.614 - 
214.619). 
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scilicet “a nullo homine Coriscus est alter”, sequitur oppositum antecedentis, scilicet 
“a Socrate Coriscus non est alter” ; et haec contradicit primae “a Socrate Coriscus est 
alter” ; ergo consequentia prima bona. Ergo ista est vera “ab homine Coriscus etc.” 
[whenever a consequent follows an antecedent, if  the latter is true, the former will 
be true too. Now, as I will prove, it does follow : “Coriscus is other than Socrates ; 
therefore, Coriscus is other than man”. The antecedent is true ; therefore, the 
consequent has to be true too. The major premise is true. Here is the proof  of  the 
minor premise : it follows that “Coriscus is other than Socrates ; therefore, etc.” since 
the consequence is sound when the consequent’s opposite follows the antecedent’s. 
Now, the antecedent’s opposite, that is to say “Coriscus is not other than Socrates”, 
follows from the consequent’s opposite, that is to say “Coriscus is no different than 
any other man” and it is at variance with “Coriscus is other than Socrates”. Therefore, 
the first consequence is a sound one. This is why “Coriscus is other than man, etc.” 
is true] ».
5. Epilegomena: beware of those who mock 
the overcultivated straw in the eye of their neighbour 
and are content with the illiterate beam in their own
Even if  one refrains from comparing the fallacy of  accident to others, it would 
seem that its situation is not so desperate after all. Our survey may not have 
sufficed to establish that there is a perfect agreement between its definition 
and the examples we read in the text. It should be proof  enough however that 
there is no major discrepancy either. The only exception turns out to be a mi-
nor one, mainly for two reasons :
1. First of  all, as we have seen, it affects an argument Aristotle set forth less 
for its own sake than in order to ensure that its counterpart was properly 
introduced. In keeping with a well-honed dialectical routine, the « Coriscus 
other than Socrates, etc. » argument functions as a subsidiary syllogism whose 
purpose is to secure – by means of  a preliminary or preparatory deduction 
– one of  the premises called for by the other example, namely the « Coriscus 
other than man, etc. » sophism.
2. Second, one might add, the most natural way of  understanding the ar-
gument is also the less disruptive of  Aristotle’s taxonomical balance among 
different families of  paralogisms. As a matter of  fact, making sense of  the 
« Coriscus other than Socrates, etc. » sophism in terms of  a fallacy of  conse-
quent instead of  accident is – if  at all – a minor twist, in so far as occasional 
overlaps between the two are vouched for by Aristotle himself :
Aristotelis sophistici elenchi, 6, 168b 27-28 : « oiJ de; para; to; eJpovmenon mevro~ eijsi; tou `sum-
bebhkovto~ [the sophisms of  consequent are part of  those of  accident] ».
Although one may (or may not) agree with Nicholas of  Paris’ assessment of  
the difficulties involved in the fallacy of  accident :
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Nicholai Parisiensis notulae super librum elenchorum, Praha Knihovna Metropolitni Ka-
pituli L.76 (1322), 56vb : « secundum fallaciam accidentis decipiuntur sapientes [even 
the wise fall for the fallacy of  accident] ».
There is little doubt that in the matter at hand sometimes the wise have tricked 
themselves. Still, every cloud has a silver lining and it is also true that scholars 
of  all ages may help each other out, provided that one does not mistake phil-
ological laziness and academic pressure for sobriety and an understandable 
concern for felling trees without reason. In top of  that, if  one has the patience 
and the humility to look at all places, she might be surprised to discover – as 
we did – that some answers are older than the questions we usually ask.
Abstract : Scholarly dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s fallacy of  accident has traditionally 
focused on his examples, whose compatibility with the fallacy’s definition has been doubted 
time and again. Besides a unified account of  the fallacy of  accident itself, the paper provides 
a formalized analysis of  its several examples in Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi. The most prob-
lematic instances are dealt with by means of  an internal reconstruction of  their features as 
conveyed by Aristotle’s text and an extensive survey of  their interpretation in the Byzantine 
and Latin exegetical tradition. Carefully handled a doxographical approach, as opposed to 
rapid results oriented practices, proves to be most effective in that it supplies both useful albeit 
ordinarily overlooked insights and a comprehensive framework of  reference for further inves-
tigations.
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